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The invitation to participate in the Kansas Law Review Symposium
was welcome, as it provided some motivation for finally setting down in
writing my thoughts about some interesting recent developments. Much
of my work has been centered on the intersection between law and
bioethics. In the latter field, there has been a growing reconsideration of
the role of bioethics and bioethicists in the debate over universal
coverage. An examination of this development can help inform broader
discussions about access to health care in the United States.
I. BIOETHICS AND ACCESS ISSUES
Issues relating to access to health care have always been an
important part of the field of bioethics. If you pick up any bioethics
textbook,' it is likely to have one or more chapters devoted to the topic of
justice and its relationship to distribution of health care resources. Much
of the current attention to that topic can be traced to the book which
many consider to have created the field of bioethics: Principles of
Biomedical Ethics.
2
That book attempted to create a theory of bioethics built around four
principles. The last of those principles was that of 'justice (a group of
norms for distributing benefits, risks, and costs fairly). 3 In the chapter
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1. See, e.g., BONNIE STEINBOCK ET AL., ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE 145-243 (6th
ed. 2003) (devoting one of the five parts to justice issues); BIOETHICS 317-426 (John Harris ed.,
2001) (devoting one of the five parts to allocation of scarce resources and quality of life);
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 355-425 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds., 5th ed.
1999) (devoting one of the ten chapters to "Justice in the Distribution of Health Care").
2. ToM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (5th ed.
2001).
3. Id. at 12. The other three principles were "(1) respect for autonomy (a norm of respecting
the decision-making capacities of autonomous persons), (2) nonmaleficence (a norm of avoiding the
causation of harm), [and] (3) beneficence (a group of norms for providing benefits and balancing
benefits against risks and costs)." Id.
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devoted to that principle, the book's authors comment that "a broad
social consensus appears to be emerging that all citizens should be able
to secure equitable access to health care, including insurance coverage
without temporal gaps and unjust exclusionary clauses. 'A They go on
further to conclude that "[p]olicies of just access to and financing of
health care ... dwarf in social importance every other issue considered in
this book."5
What are the moral arguments in favor of a right to access health
care? They fall broadly into two categories: those relating to how health
care is similar to certain other goods, and conversely, those relating to
how health care plays a special role in peoples' lives. 6 With regard to the
first category, health care might be considered analogous to other
services that governments traditionally provide, such as police, fire
departments, and collecting trash.7  The reasons justifying the
government's provision of those services might similarly justify
providing health care. With regard to the second category, the argument
is that having poor health significantly diminishes a person's ability to
otherwise function appropriately and take advantage of the opportunities
that society provides. It would, accordingly, be unjust not to provide that
person with the health care that would restore their ability to "use their
capacities.",
8
In spite of these pronouncements in favor of the need for justice with
regard to access to health care, there have been other indications that
access issues are not always accorded such great importance. For
example, it certainly remains the case that these issues are rarely given
special prominence in bioethics curricula. Yes, some textbooks have one
or a few chapters devoted to justice and access to health care, but they
are never the biggest sections in these books. Often, that honor would go
to topics relating to end-of-life decision-making, perhaps befitting its
prominent role in the law and bioethics arena. And while some
4. ld. at 241.
5. Id. at 272.
6. Id. at 242.
7. There are nonetheless good arguments for distinguishing health care services from many of
the other services that governments typically provide. In particular, the latter services often have the
character of being "social goods." Id. at 242.
8. Id. at 243. Just as with the other category of arguments, this category is also subject to
counter-arguments. For example, it might be argued that while having poor health does indeed
reduce a person's opportunities, there are other disadvantages that are even more significant factors
in reducing opportunities (such as low income, living in a neighborhood with poor schools, etc.), yet
our society has not chosen to remedy those disadvantages.
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distinguished bioethicists have devoted their careers to access issues, 9
they constitute a relatively small percentage of the field.
It was against this background that the leading professional
organization representing bioethicists, the American Society for
Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH), in 2000 debated making certain
changes in its bylaws.'0 Two years earlier, some ASBH members asked
the board of directors to protest actions a medical center took against a
prominent bioethicist when she testified under subpoena in a lawsuit
against that employer. The board discovered that, even under the rubric
of supporting academic freedom, they were not permitted to take such a
position as it was prohibited by the ASBH bylaws. As a result of that
circumstance, a committee was created to look into the appropriateness
of "taking stands" of various types.
The committee's proposals were debated at an annual ASBH
meeting. "And a lively-nay, rancorous--debate it was. Tempers
flared, passions ran high, and it became abundantly clear that we all
needed more time to think about whether [it] should, as a Society, take
stands of various kinds."" In my personal recollection of that event, one
of the main topics discussed related specifically to taking a stand in favor
of universal access to health care. The advocates of that position were
indeed spirited. To give a sense of the level of emotion, one proponent, a
Holocaust survivor, drew an analogy between the ASBH's failure to take
a position and those who stood by and did nothing to stop the Nazi
atrocities. The members of the organization ultimately voted in favor of
allowing the ASBH to take stands on matters relating to academic
freedom and professionalism, but against allowing opinions relating to
"substantive and moral policy issues."' 2
The issues raised in that debate have not been limited to merely
whether a professional organization should be taking stands. The events
that took place at the ASBH are part of a growing debate within bioethics
about what fields of study bioethicists should be involved with. Whether
it is at national meetings, online discussion groups, or small informal
gatherings, that somewhat self-referential topic has an excellent chance
of popping up.
9. Perhaps most prominent is Harvard professor Norman Daniels, author of JUST HEALTH
CARE (1985) and other works on how health care should be fairly distributed.
10. Daniel I. Wiklered, The ASBH 'Taking Stands' Debate, ASBH EXCHANGE (Am. Soc'y for
Bioethics and Human., Glenview, Ill.), Summer 2001, at 1.
11. Id.
12. Bylaws of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, Article Ill, §§ 4.1-4.2 ("The
Society shall not issue positions on substantive moral and policy issues, [but] may adopt positions on
matters related to academic freedom and professionalism.").
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A good example of the terms of this debate is provided by a recent
letter to the editor printed in a prestigious bioethics journal, the Hastings
Center Report. The letter, from two South African bioethics scholars,
took issue with the views expressed in a previous article criticizing the
"conservative agenda" in bioethics, and contrasted it to the greater
attention to justice issues given by bioethics' more liberal wing. 13 The
South Africans commented that American bioethics as a whole,
regardless of political persuasion, had a narrow agenda. 14 It focuses, so
they say, on issues relating to reproduction-abortion, assisted
reproduction, embryos-to the exclusion of even more important
issues. They observe that the U.S. bioethics agenda "is ethically
insensitive to the claims of hundreds of millions of poor who lack
meaningful rights or access to even minimal health care.' 6
Norman Daniels, a Harvard professor and leading scholar on health
care distribution issues, has written in a similar vein. In an article
entitled Equity and Population Health: Toward a Broader Bioethics
Agenda, he noted:
Bioethics's traditional focus on clinical relationships and exotic
technologies has led the field away from population health, health
disparities, and issues of justice. The result: a myopic view that... can
overlook factors that affect health more broadly than do exotic
technologies. A broader bioethics agenda would take up unresolved
questions about the distribution of health and the development of fair
policies that affect health distribution. 17
II. WHAT IS THE PROPER ROLE FOR AMERICAN ACADEMIC BIOETHICS?
The comments by these scholars, and the views of the broader
community they echo, at the least raise a number of important issues.
Given that this is a symposium among academics, and that it focuses on
issues stemming from the lack of universal access to health care in the
United States, I would like to address a relevant subset of these issues.
In particular, what is the proper role for academic bioethics with regard
to the universal access debate in this country? Should it be spending less
time dealing with relatively exotic and "elite" issues, mainly relevant to
13. Solly Benatar & Theodore Fleischer, Letter to the Editor, Bioethics with Blinders,




17. Norman Daniels, Equity and Population Health: Toward a Broader Bioethics Agenda,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 2006, at 22, 22.
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the upper-middle class and rich, and more time on access issues that
affect the poorest segments of our society? Is it appropriate that the
profession as a whole, and individual bioethicists, change their focus?
To answer this important question it is necessary to delve into the
proper role of academic inquiry, particularly as it relates to ethical issues.
For that purpose, a relevant source is the debate generated by Richard
Posner with his controversial Harvard Law Review article The
Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory. 18 As summarized in the
preface to the article, "'academic moralism . . . lacks either the
intellectual cogency or the emotional power to change people's beliefs or
behavior; the power to do so resides in 'moral entrepreneurs,' which
academic moralists emphatically are not."' 9
Posner's analysis was challenged by a who's who of prominent legal
scholars, whose responses accompanied his article.2°  They gave a
variety of arguments, many of them noting, among other things, that
Posner failed to provide much (if any) evidence supporting his
conclusion that moral theory is ineffective in changing viewpoints, and
that there are indeed many counterexamples to his proposition.2' As
someone who works in academic law and bioethics and makes his living
producing arguments that have at least some moral elements, I am
certainly reluctant to endorse Posner's main point. But a comment by
Charles Fried in his response-noting that Posner's position was "too
gross and unnuanced" 22 -suggests a possible middle position, one that is
appropriately nuanced. There might indeed be a grain of truth (though
perhaps only that) in Posner's view of the limits of academic moral
reasoning. That grain might in fact have some relevance to particular
issues--one of which might be the general question, as opposed to more
18. Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, I I l HARV. L. REV. 1637
(1998). This article was later expanded intro a book: RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF
MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999).
19. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, supra note 18, at 1638.
20. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718, 1718
(1998) (describing Posner's contentions as "bad arguments"); Charles Fried, Philosophy Matters,
Ill HARV. L. REV. 1739, 1740 (1998) (arguing that Posner's lectures are an attack against moral and
political philosophy); Anthony T. Kronman, The Value of Moral Philosophy, Ill HARV. L. REV.
1751, 1753 (1998) (adamantly rejecting "Posner's despair"); John T. Noonan, Jr., Posner's
Problematics, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1768, 1769 (1998) (discussing how Posner's seemingly
"pragmatic criterion" is "vacuous"); Martha C. Nussbaum, Still Worthy of Praise, Ill HARV. L.
REV. 1776, 1789 (1998) (stating that Posner's argument is flawed). A response by Posner appears in
Richard A. Posner, Reply to Critics of the Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, Ill HARV. L.
REV. 1796 (1998).
21. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 20, at 1739-45 (arguing that "the few empirical studies ... to
which Posner alludes do not carry much force" and providing counterexamples).
22. Id. at 1739.
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specific formulations, of the lack of universal access to health care in the
United States.
Specifically, what is it that academic bioethics has to add to the
analysis of that question? For decades, the leading viewpoint has been
that the strongest arguments favor the conclusion that the lack of
universal access is morally troubling. The arguments in favor of that
viewpoint appear to have changed relatively little over time. Given that
circumstance, and picking up on Posner's distinction of academic
moralists from academic entrepreneurs, it is far from clear that there is
much more that academic moralists can do with regard to this question.
Granted, we could have a greater percentage of the academic bioethics
community addressing it, but what is that likely to accomplish?
Certainly, the better informed members of the public, who are regularly
confronted with stories about how tens of millions are uninsured each
year, and the troubling circumstances that befall specific members of that
group, are unlikely to find more articles by bioethicists as the crucial
additional item that tips the balance in favor of convincing those who are
not yet convinced that the current state of affairs is immoral.
Getting back to a major element of the recent debate within the
bioethics community-the issue of whether the ASBH should take a
stand opposing the lack of universal access-it is difficult to see how
doing so would have anything beyond a rather trivial effect on the debate
in this country. Surely, major newspapers will not publish the fact that
an organization with less than two thousand members has concluded that
the lack of universal access to health care in the United States is morally
troubling. Even if, miracle of miracles, this event did indeed receive
substantial press coverage, it is extremely unlikely that that would alter
the thinking of even a small percentage of Americans. The facts relating
to the millions of uninsured are so well publicized that something far
beyond a position taken by an academic society is needed to change
attitudes. Some people may still remain unconvinced that there is
anything wrong with this state of affairs. Some Americans might indeed
already think that the current situation is immoral, but they may
nonetheless be unwilling to suffer significant hardship-for example,
more than a trivial increase in their taxes-in order to change the status
quo.
There is substantial evidence that a great many Americans want
some appropriate effort at change. As I prepared this article, the New
York Times reported on a poll it helped conduct, revealing a "striking
willingness" on the part of Americans "to make tradeoffs to guarantee
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health insurance for all, including paying as much as five hundred dollars
more in taxes a year and forgoing future tax cuts. '23 Sixty-four percent
of respondents indicated that the government "should guarantee health
insurance for all.",24 "Nearly eight in ten said they thought it was more
important to provide universal access to health insurance than to extend
the tax cuts of recent years. 25 In the face of these rather compelling
statements of public opinion-which, certainly in recent years, is split
almost fifty-fifty on so many issues of national importance-there
remain of course numerous factors (such as the political power of the
insurance industry) that might nonetheless prevent universal health
insurance from becoming a reality. Whatever the outcome, it
nonetheless seems clear that greater forces are at work than are likely to
be shaped by bioethical pronouncements on the moral status of the
existing American health care system.
III. A FUTURE ROLE FOR BIOETHICAL ANALYSIS
Having concluded that bioethics is unlikely to have much to
contribute to changing attitudes regarding the "big" question-the
morality of the American health access status quo-does not mean that
there is no role for bioethics in the access debate. Far from it. For as this
nation continues to tackle access issues, it will have to address a
multitude of narrower, but crucial, ethical issues. The debate over the
new Massachusetts health care plan that is the focus of this symposium
provides many examples of this narrower (but not less important) role for
bioethical reasoning.
Consider, for example, a recent issue of the Hastings Center Report
which was devoted primarily to commentaries on the Massachusetts
plan.26  Accompanying a lead-in article by an MIT economist which
described the plan 27 were five commentaries providing differing
reactions to the plan. While one contributor appeared likely to have
objected to any government plan designed to give Americans greater
23. Robin Toner & Janet Elder, Most Support U.S. Guarantee of Health Plans, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 2, 2007, at Al.
24. Id. at A5.
25. Id.
26. HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 2006.
27. Jonathan Gruber, The Massachusetts Health Care Revolution: A Local Start for Universal
Access, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 14. A lead-in to this article notes that the
author served as an advisor to the State of Massachusetts regarding this plan. Gregory Kaebnick,
Bipartisan Health Reform?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 2.
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access to health care,28 the others based their evaluations on specific
aspects of the plan. For example, one pair of authors concluded the plan
was "half a step forward and three steps back," having dissected the flow
of money and determining that it would "generate huge new revenues for
private insurers, vastly increase payments to already flush hospitals,
excuse the wealthy from sharing the burden of covering the uninsured,




Another pair of authors highlighted the fact that Massachusetts was
requiring individuals to purchase health insurance so long as an
"affordable" plan was available. 30  They concluded that "[d]etermining
the appropriate contribution expected of individuals is the central
philosophical and economic question facing those implementing the
Massachusetts plan."31 And one commentator concluded that
"Massachusetts appears to have orchestrated broader deliberations about
access, accountability, and affordability than the United States has seen
since the Oregon Health Plan .... [It] has taken a necessary first step in
what could ultimately lead to far-reaching changes."
32
This set of articles provides a fair representation of the future of
bioethical commentary on the American health care access issue:
application of bioethical reasoning, but using that reasoning to provide
answers to relatively specific questions of fairness. Perhaps we might
borrow from the terminology of economics, and distinguish the
traditional macro-ethical analysis from a newer emphasis on micro-
ethical analysis. What is notable about this change is not merely the
scope of the problems that will need to be addressed, but also an
accompanying change in the manner of the analysis. Norman Daniels, in
his arguments for a new agenda for bioethics more focused on
distributional issues,33 barely mentions this crucial point, only briefly and
28. Michael Tanner, The Wrong Road to Reform, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at
24. Tanner noted that "for all its flaws, American health care is of the highest quality available
anywhere in the world," and that "government control will ultimately erode those things that are best
about the U.S. system while doing little to solve the system's problems." Id. at 26.
29. Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, The New Massachusetts Health Reform:
Halfa Step Forward and Three Steps Back, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 19, 21.
30. Susan Dorr Goold & Nancy M. Baum, Define "Affordable", HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 22.
31. ld. at23.
32. James Sabin, "'Disappointing but Fair": The Connector's Challenge, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 26, 27.
33. See Daniels, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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vaguely noting that this new bioethics agenda will require bioethicists to
undertake new types of training "in a wide range of social sciences. 34
This likely change in the manner of bioethical analysis is far more
clearly articulated by Alex John London in commenting on Daniels'
proposal.35  He observes that to succeed in performing meaningful
analysis of distributional issues, bioethicists "must become proficient in
some highly technical academic disciplines. In particular, the field will
have to deepen its engagement with economics, not only at the level of
application, but at the level of first principles. '36 London goes on to
highlight the current important role of cost-benefit analysis in evaluating
distributional questions, and the "unexplored" implications of this
technique for ethics. "In order to motivate their use in a broader policy
context, bioethicists will need to understand their implications and
demonstrate their relevance to issues of equity.
37
IV. BACK TO LAW AND BIOETHICS
It is hard to predict to what extent either the agenda, or the mode of
analysis, of bioethics will change in years to come. Nonetheless, it is
likely that at least some of the changes discussed above will indeed take
place. What I find especially interesting is that these changes will move
the field of bioethics (and thus the sub-field of law and bioethics) toward
a more detail-oriented and interdisciplinary role, one that will fit in well
with the type of legal and policy analyses that were presented at this
symposium. This bodes well for future fruitful collaborations between
legal scholars and bioethicists in dealing with the complex issue of
deciding what constitutes an appropriate amount of fairness in the
allocation of health care.
34. Id. at 34.
35. Alex John London, What Is Social and Global Justice to Bioethics or Bioethics to Social
and Global Justice?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 2006, at 3.
36. Id
37. Id.
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